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Abolish the Renters' (Reform) Bill

Reform UK · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Reform UK’s policy “Abolish the Renters' (Reform) Bill” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Affordable housing — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

This policy would remove key protections for renters — including eviction safeguards, decent homes standards, and rent-increase limits — while scrapping a landlord tax rule that could modestly boost rental supply. The net effect is likely worse conditions and less security for the 11 million people renting privately, even if some rents stabilise.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether scrapping Section 24 would materially increase rental supply enough to offset the harm from removing tenant protections — landlord and independent analysts disagree on the size of the supply effect.

Our reading: This policy has two distinct components with different directional effects on O1, but they do not cancel out. On tenant protections: The evidence is consistent and strong that abolishing the Renters' Rights Act would strip away multiple protections that directly bear on housing security and quality for renters. No-fault evictions would likely return, removing tenure security (E3, E6). The Decent Homes Standard extension — which would have addressed the 21% of private rental stock that is non-decent, disproportionately affecting lower-income renters (E11, E14) — would be removed (E13). The Ombudsman and Property Portal would go, leaving tenants with complaint routes that the evidence shows are already failing badly: two-thirds of councils prosecuted no landlords despite 300,000 complaints (E22), enforcement capacity has been cut by 41% (E25), and enforcement is described as 'inconsistent, ineffective and hard for tenants to have executed on their behalf' (E27). The policy promises to 'boost monitoring, appeals and enforcement' as a substitute, but evidence shows this would require sustained investment that councils demonstrably lack (E28). There is no cited evidence that the proposed alternative would match the Act's protections. On Section 24: Scrapping it may provide some supply-side benefit — keeping landlords in the market, possibly moderating rent increases (E34, E37). However, the supply effect is contested (E43), the magnitude is uncertain, and it could simultaneously drive up purchase prices by making buy-to-let more attractive again (E40), harming would-be owner-occupiers. The supply-side potential upside from Section 24 repeal is real but speculative and contested. The downside from removing tenant protections — affecting 11 million renters — is well-evidenced and immediate. The net verdict for O1 is a moderate worsening, driven primarily by the removal of security of tenure, housing quality standards, and effective redress, against a weak enforcement baseline that the policy's own alternative cannot credibly repair.

Tax & the money you keep — Helps

minor · moderate confidence

Scrapping Section 24 would cut the tax bill for buy-to-let landlords — especially higher-rate taxpayers — by restoring full mortgage interest relief, putting more money in their pockets. The gain is real but limited to landlords, not tenants, and the distributional tilt is strongly toward wealthier property owners.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether increased landlord profitability would translate into lower rents (improving tenants' effective incomes) or simply higher landlord margins depends on supply and market dynamics that the evidence does not resolve.

Our reading: The O11 effect of this policy turns almost entirely on scrapping Section 24. The Renters' Rights Act abolition affects tenancy security and housing conditions (O1, O2) but does not directly change anyone's tax burden. Section 24 currently taxes landlords on gross rental income rather than profit, pushing higher-rate taxpayers into higher bands and creating a phantom income problem. Reverting to full mortgage interest deductibility would directly reduce the tax liability of individual buy-to-let landlords — a genuine, measurable improvement in take-home money for that group. However, the distributional picture matters for O11 scoring. The relief is concentrated among higher-rate taxpayer landlords (those with larger mortgage liabilities relative to income). The 45% of landlords owning a single property include many lower-income landlords who may already be basic-rate taxpayers and thus less affected. The broader population — 11 million private renters — sees no direct O11 gain; any benefit to them would flow indirectly via potential rent stabilisation, which is a contested projection (E36–E37) not a direct tax effect. The direction is therefore improves, but magnitude is minor: the improvement is real for a sub-population of property-owning landlords, not the general household. No IFS or OBR distributional analysis of this specific change is available in the evidence (E41), which limits confidence. The absence of independent institutional modelling prevents a moderate or major rating. The counterfactual absent the policy is continued Section 24 taxation of landlord gross income, so the additionality is genuine for affected landlords. But the policy does not improve the tax position of renters, wage earners, or most households — only a specific asset-holding group benefits on O11.

Public finances & the next generation — Hurts

minor · low confidence

Scrapping Section 24 would reduce tax revenues from landlords with no identified offsetting funding, while boosting enforcement processes would require new public spending — both worsen the fiscal position. The scale of the revenue loss is unknown because no OBR or IFS costing of these specific measures is available.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: The Exchequer cost of restoring full mortgage-interest relief for landlords has not been independently costed by OBR or IFS, so the magnitude of the fiscal hit is genuinely uncertain.

Our reading: Two distinct fiscal pressures arise from this policy. First, scrapping Section 24 removes a tax measure that was deliberately designed to increase Exchequer receipts from landlords by limiting mortgage interest relief to the basic rate. Restoring full deductibility would reduce income tax revenues from higher-rate landlord taxpayers — an unfunded tax cut in O12 terms. No OBR or IFS costing of this specific reversal is provided in the evidence, so magnitude is uncertain, but the direction is clear: lower tax take without a stated offset. Second, the commitment to 'boost monitoring, appeals, and enforcement processes' for renters implies new public expenditure on local authority capacity. The evidence shows enforcement capacity has been severely degraded — funding fell 41% between 2010 and 2020 — and any credible improvement requires 'significant and sustained investment.' Again, no funding source is identified in the policy text. Neither component is framed as productive investment that might raise future fiscal capacity; the tax cut benefits current landlords and the enforcement spending is a current service cost. Absent any identified revenue offset or borrowing-to-invest rationale, both elements worsen the near-term fiscal position. Confidence is low because no independent body has costed these specific measures, and the magnitude of the Section 24 reversal in particular is unknown from the provided evidence.

Inequality & fair shares — Hurts

moderate · moderate confidence

This policy removes protections that mainly benefit renters — who are typically less wealthy — while giving tax relief primarily to higher-rate landlord taxpayers, likely widening the income and wealth gap. The main uncertainty is whether scrapping Section 24 genuinely boosts supply enough to lower rents and offset those distributional costs.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether scrapping Section 24 increases rental supply and stabilises rents at scale, which is the main channel through which the policy could partially offset its regressive distributional effects.

Our reading: Both components of this policy shift gains toward landlords and away from tenants. On the Renters' Rights Act: renters are typically less wealthy than landlords, and the Act's protections — security of tenure, the Decent Homes Standard, rent-increase limits, and the Ombudsman — were specifically targeted at the lower end of the housing market. The IFS baseline shows 25% of lower-income PRS families already live in non-decent homes; abolishing the statutory standard removes the only mechanism requiring improvement. The existing enforcement baseline is weak (fewer than 2% of complaints lead to formal enforcement), and the policy's promised 'boosted monitoring and appeals' carries no committed budget, statutory duty, or quantified target — so the soft-verb rule applies and those gains cannot be credited as delivered. On Section 24: the tax relief flows primarily to higher-rate taxpayer landlords, a group that is by definition above the median income and wealth distribution. The counterfactual supply argument — that more landlords entering the market will lower rents and benefit lower-income tenants — is a plausible channel but is advanced mainly by landlord advocacy sources (NRLA, Propertymark) and is not corroborated by independent institutional analysis in the evidence provided; it cannot therefore drive a positive distributional verdict. Scrapping Section 24 also risks pushing up property prices, widening the wealth gap between owners and non-owners. On balance, the evidence points clearly toward a widening of the gap: protections for a low-income group (renters) are removed, and tax relief accrues disproportionately to a higher-income group (landlords). The magnitude is moderate given the 11 million people affected, with confidence moderate because the rent-supply effect introduces genuine uncertainty about the scale of harm.

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