Increase police numbers by 40,000
Reform UK · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Reform UK’s policy “Increase police numbers by 40,000” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Public finances & the next generation — Hurts
moderate · moderate confidence
Adding 40,000 police officers would cost well over a billion pounds a year with no stated funding source, worsening the public finances unless offset elsewhere. The policy text names no tax rise, spending cut, or borrowing rule to pay for it.
The evidence
- The policy commits to recruiting 40,000 additional front-line officers over one parliament with no stated funding mechanism. — reformparty.uk (manifesto) — “adding 40,000 new front-line officers over a five-year parliament”
- The IFS costed a 10,000-officer pledge at £300 million, implying 40,000 officers would cost roughly £1.2 billion or more. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) noted that the Labour Party's pledge to recruit 10,000 additional police officers by 2021-22 was costed at £300 million”
- Police funding combines central government grants and local council tax precepts, so a major expansion has implications for both central borrowing and local tax burdens. — governmentevents.co.uk (media) — “Police funding is derived from a combination of central government grants and local council tax precepts”
- Maintaining net officer numbers requires offsetting a high leaver rate; around 8,795 officers left in the year to March 2025, meaning gross recruitment must substantially exceed the 40,000 net target. — gov.uk (media) — “In the year ending March 31, 2025, 8,795 FTE police officers left the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales, representing a leaver rate of 6.0%”
- A substantial increase in officer numbers would require a review of the police funding formula, adding further fiscal complexity. — police-foundation.org.uk (media) — “Any substantial increase in officer numbers would necessitate a review of the police funding formula, which has seen a pronounced shift towards local precept funding since 2015-16”
Biggest unknown: Whether the policy is accompanied by a credible offsetting fiscal measure — if funded, the verdict would change substantially.
Our reading: The policy commits to a large, specific workforce expansion — 40,000 officers over five years — but the stated text contains no funding mechanism: no identified tax rise, spending reallocation, or borrowing rule. Scaling from the IFS estimate for a 10,000-officer pledge (£300m), a 40,000-officer commitment implies a recurring cost of roughly £1.2bn annually or more at today's prices, making this a significant unfunded spending commitment. The high leaver rate (~8,800 per year in England and Wales alone) means gross recruitment must be substantially higher than the net 40,000 figure to achieve the stated per-capita target, which amplifies the fiscal pressure. Police funding draws on both central grants and local precepts, so the burden could land on central borrowing, council tax, or both — in any scenario adding to fiscal pressure without identified offsets. Under the O12 rubric, unfunded spending that increases the deficit and adds to the debt path worsens public finances for the next generation. There is no evidence in the provided units of a credible fiscal offset. The magnitude is rated moderate rather than major because the ~£1.2bn annual figure, while large in absolute terms, represents a manageable fraction of total public expenditure — material but not transformative to the overall debt path. If the policy were paired with identified funding (cuts elsewhere or new revenue), the verdict would change; absent that, the direction is clearly a worsening of O12.
Crime, justice & national security — Helps
moderate · moderate confidence
Adding 40,000 front-line officers would meaningfully increase police presence and is associated with some crime reduction, especially property crime, though the actual safety gain depends heavily on how those officers are deployed, not just their numbers.
The evidence
- The policy commits to recruiting 40,000 new front-line officers over a five-year parliament, raising the ratio to 300 per 100,000 population. — reformparty.uk (manifesto) — “adding 40,000 new front-line officers over a five-year parliament”
- England and Wales currently have 235 officers per 100,000 resident population, well below the proposed 300 target. — gov.uk (media) — “235 officers per 100,000 resident population”
- England and Wales have a lower officer-to-population ratio than Scotland (316), France (332), Germany (298), and the European average of 357. — policeprofessional.com (media) — “England and Wales had 228 officers per 100,000 people, compared to Scotland's 316, France's 332, and Germany's 298, while the European average across 32 nations was 357”
- Around 8,795 officers left England and Wales forces in the year ending March 2025, a leaver rate of 6.0%, meaning recruitment must substantially outpace departures to achieve net growth. — gov.uk (media) — “8,795 FTE police officers left the 43 territorial police forces in England and Wales, representing a leaver rate of 6.0%”
- The previous Police Uplift Programme successfully recruited 20,000 additional officers between 2019 and 2023, demonstrating large-scale recruitment is achievable. — vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com (media) — “successfully recruited 20,000 additional officers in England and Wales between September 2019 and March 2023”
- Research cited by the College of Policing suggests a 10% increase in officers could be linked to a 3% reduction in property crime, indicating a real but modest effect. — assets-hmicfrs.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk (government) — “a 10% increase in officers could be linked to a 3% reduction in property crime”
- The NAO noted that crime-reduction benefits from increased officer numbers would depend on a complex range of factors and would take several years to materialise. — nao.org.uk (institutional) — “the benefits in reducing crime and improving public safety would depend on a complex range of factors beyond just officer numbers and would take several years to materialise”
- The College of Policing notes that simply increasing numbers without considering how officers use their time may not be effective. — college.police.uk (media) — “simply increasing numbers without considering how officers use their time may not be effective”
Biggest unknown: Whether deployment strategy and funding mechanisms are in place to translate raw officer numbers into measurable crime reductions — research suggests deployment matters as much as headcount.
Our reading: The policy commits to a large, concrete increase in officer numbers — from roughly 235 to 300 per 100,000 — representing a ~28% uplift on current England and Wales figures. The UK's comparatively low ratio relative to European peers provides a plausible baseline rationale. The prior Police Uplift Programme shows that recruiting at scale (20,000 officers in ~3.5 years) is operationally feasible, which supports delivery plausibility for 40,000 over five years, though the attrition rate of ~8,800 leavers per year means gross recruitment must be substantially higher to achieve net additions. On crime-reduction effect, the evidence is real but conditional. The College of Policing's cited estimate suggests a 10% officer increase links to roughly a 3% reduction in property crime — a genuine but modest signal. However, two credible research findings temper optimism: a study of 42 forces over 13 years found officer numbers per se are 'unrelated to crime rates'; and the College of Policing itself warns that numbers without effective deployment may not reduce crime. The NAO similarly noted benefits depend on 'a complex range of factors beyond just officer numbers.' These are not fringe views — they are institutional and academic assessments from within the provided evidence. Absent the policy, officer numbers remain at a comparatively low ratio and the evidence base (particularly the SMF argument cited) links this to public confidence and capacity to tackle evolving crime types like fraud. The counterfactual gain is therefore real: more officers, if well-deployed, plausibly improve the O5 indicators of crime rates and public safety. The direction is 'improves' because the weight of evidence supports a positive effect, and the delivery mechanism (recruitment) is concrete and precedented. However, magnitude is 'moderate' rather than 'major' because the crime-reduction per officer is modest per the evidence and contingent on deployment quality. Confidence is moderate because the deployment-vs-numbers debate introduces genuine uncertainty, but the baseline case for more officers having some positive safety effect is well-supported.