Show the Working

Return to Erasmus Plus Programme

Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “Return to Erasmus Plus Programme” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Hurts

minor · moderate confidence

Rejoining Erasmus+ costs roughly £570 million per year — about five times the Turing Scheme it replaces — adding a significant new spending commitment with no guaranteed offsetting revenue. Economic benefit estimates exist but come from the universities lobby, so cannot carry full weight.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the economic returns from increased student and professional mobility (including inward EU participants and skills gains) are large enough to offset the ~£460 million net cost increase over the Turing Scheme.

Our reading: Rejoining Erasmus+ raises annual public expenditure from roughly £100–110 million (Turing Scheme) to approximately £570 million — a net increase of around £460 million per year. This is a real and committed fiscal cost from 2027/28 onward. Against this, the main economic-return estimate (a net £243 million boost) comes from Universities UK International, an advocacy body with a direct institutional interest in the outcome. Under the source rules, this cannot be the sole or primary basis for a verdict; no independent OBR or IFS costing of the rejoining appears in the evidence. The IFS findings cited (E7/E17) concern individual labour-market outcomes, not macro fiscal returns or Exchequer-level cost-benefit. The government's own position is to review after one year (E33), signalling the fiscal sustainability of continued membership is unresolved. The investment could plausibly raise future human capital and attract EU students and fees (E10, E11), but no evidence unit grounds this at a scale sufficient to offset the cost increase. On the evidence as provided, the net fiscal effect is a spending increase of roughly £460 million annually for at least one year, with returns speculative at macro level. This modestly worsens the near-term debt path. The 30% discount and review clause reduce but do not eliminate the concern. Magnitude is minor relative to total public spending, and the time horizon is this parliament (commencing 2027/28).

Inequality & fair shares — Little effect

minor · low confidence

Rejoining Erasmus+ primarily expands study-abroad opportunities, with some targeted support for disadvantaged participants, but its direct effect on income and wealth inequality is indirect and small-scale. The programme's reach is too limited, and its benefits too concentrated among university-going populations, to move the overall inequality gap materially.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether targeted grants for disadvantaged participants are sufficient to make participation genuinely cross-class, or whether uptake remains skewed toward already-advantaged students — which would determine whether any narrowing effect materialises at all.

Our reading: O14 is about whether the gap between the richest and the rest narrows or widens. Erasmus+ is primarily an educational mobility programme. Its most direct channel to inequality runs through access: if disadvantaged young people gain meaningful access to international study and training, the long-run earnings and opportunity gap could narrow modestly. The evidence provides some support for this — grants explicitly cover living costs and target disadvantaged and disabled participants, and IFS research shows credit-constrained students gain disproportionately from studying abroad. The Turing Scheme baseline also shows near-half participation from disadvantaged backgrounds, suggesting such schemes can reach beyond purely affluent groups. However, several factors limit the inequality-narrowing effect. The programme is concentrated among university students and vocational trainees — a population that, even with grants, skews toward those already better positioned than school-leavers who never enter higher education. The scale (100,000 in year one) is small relative to the UK working-age population. The IFS finding on working abroad is a long-run labour-market outcome, not a direct inequality measure, and the study is from 2011. There is no cited evidence that Erasmus+ participation, at this scale, moves aggregate Gini or regional inequality indicators. The mechanism from 'more study-abroad' to 'narrower income gap' is plausible but indirect and slow-acting. Given these constraints, the most defensible verdict is negligible at minor magnitude over the long term: there is a theoretical channel and some distributional targeting, but the evidence does not support a confident claim that the gap between richest and rest narrows at population scale as a result of this policy.

Education & opportunity — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Rejoining Erasmus+ would restore international study, teaching, and volunteering opportunities for thousands of UK young people, with grants covering costs and extra support for disadvantaged participants. The main caveat is that placements don't start until 2027/28 and the government has flagged it will review continued participation after just one year.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the UK commits beyond the initial 2027/28 year and whether the £570 million annual cost is judged affordable long-term, which could see the programme cancelled again.

Our reading: The evidence clearly shows that leaving Erasmus+ and replacing it with the Turing Scheme significantly reduced the scale, scope, and quality of international mobility for UK learners. The Turing Scheme covered roughly half the number of participants at a fraction of the budget, lacked tuition fee funding, excluded inward student and staff mobility, and suffered from single-year financial uncertainty. Erasmus+, by contrast, offers broader coverage across higher education, vocational training, schools, and adult learning — all relevant to O7's criteria. Rejoining restores reciprocal mobility, tuition fee grants, and extra support for disadvantaged participants, directly improving equity of access to international study. The IFS evidence links studying abroad to long-term employability gains, with a stronger effect for credit-constrained students — the very group Erasmus+ targets with its disadvantaged-background grants. The magnitude is moderate rather than major because: (a) placements don't start until 2027/28, so benefits are long-term; (b) the government's own one-year review clause creates uncertainty about permanence; and (c) the previous participation baseline (around 18,000 UK students and trainees in 2018-19) suggests the absolute numbers, while meaningful, are a small share of the total student population. Confidence is moderate because the benefits evidence is strong but the one-year review and £570 million annual cost introduce genuine political sustainability risk that could reverse the policy before it embeds.