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Increase School and College Funding and Repair Buildings

Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “Increase School and College Funding and Repair Buildings” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Public finances & the next generation — Hurts

minor · low confidence

The policy commits to above-inflation per-pupil spending rises every year and a major capital programme to fix school buildings, but names no funding source — so it risks adding to borrowing. The building investment is more defensible as productive capital, but the open-ended revenue commitment is the bigger fiscal concern.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the spending is funded by offsetting cuts or tax rises elsewhere, or is borrowed — the policy text is silent on this, and that gap determines whether the fiscal effect is neutral or negative.

Our reading: The policy has two fiscal components that must be assessed separately under O12. First, the recurring commitment to above-inflation per-pupil funding increases: this is an open-ended revenue spending commitment with no stated funding mechanism. Given that IFS evidence shows current funding is already below 2010 real-terms levels and SEND cost pressures are projected to create a £6 billion structural gap, the baseline pressure is already severe. Committing to above-inflation rises every year — permanently, in perpetuity — materially increases the Exchequer's forward obligation. Without an identified offset, this adds to borrowing or crowds out other spending. Second, the capital investment in buildings: the £13.8 billion backlog is real and documented. Capital spending on school buildings is more defensibly productive investment — evidence suggests well-maintained buildings reduce long-run maintenance costs and can improve human capital outcomes (which feeds future tax revenues). This component is closer to borrowing-to-invest, which under O12's macro-neutral rubric is less damaging than unfunded consumption spending. The offsetting SEND cost risk (OBR's £6bn gap, uncertain reform outcomes) means even a well-funded version of this policy faces enormous fiscal headwinds that could swallow the claimed improvement. On balance, the recurring above-inflation revenue commitment, being open-ended and unfunded, tilts the verdict to a minor worsening of long-run fiscal sustainability. The capital element partially offsets this by financing productive assets. Confidence is low because the verdict turns almost entirely on whether the policy is funded — which the text does not address.

Education & opportunity — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Committing to above-inflation funding per pupil every year and fixing crumbling school buildings would meaningfully improve education and opportunity — but the real gain depends on whether extra money actually reaches classrooms rather than being swallowed by rising SEND costs.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether above-inflation headline increases will translate into more resource per mainstream pupil, given the OBR's projected £6 billion SEND funding gap that could absorb or reverse those gains.

Our reading: The policy addresses two of the most concrete identified weaknesses in English education: chronic underfunding per pupil (especially in FE/sixth forms, which remain well below 2010 levels) and a £13.8 billion buildings backlog that the DfE itself flagged as a structural safety risk. An above-inflation per-pupil commitment, if delivered, would reverse a long period of real-terms stagnation and, given the evidence linking spending increases to measurable GCSE gains, can reasonably be expected to improve attainment — particularly for colleges and sixth forms that have fallen furthest. Fixing crumbling buildings plausibly raises attendance, teacher retention, and learning quality. These are genuine improvements to O7. The central caveat is SEND. The OBR projects a £6 billion SEND funding gap by 2028-29; if even a fraction of that lands on the core schools budget, headline per-pupil increases could be partially or fully negated in practice — as has already happened with recent increases, more than half of which were absorbed by SEND costs. The IFS projects that current cash increases (2.8%) already fall short of rising school costs (3.6%). The policy text makes no reference to SEND reform or ring-fencing, so delivery of the stated gain is genuinely uncertain. On buildings, the NAO backlog figure is based on data from 2017-19 and the true remediation cost could be substantially higher; current capital plans, while up 17% in real terms for 2025-26, are still below what the DfE estimated is needed. On balance, the policy's direction is clearly positive for O7 — the commitments address real, evidenced gaps — but the magnitude is moderated by the SEND risk and the likelihood that buildings investment, while welcome, may not be sufficient to fully clear the backlog within a parliament.