Introduce a wealth tax and reform capital gains and inheritance taxes
Green · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Green’s policy “Introduce a wealth tax and reform capital gains and inheritance taxes” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Affordable housing — Little effect
minor · low confidence
This policy is primarily a tax reform targeting the very wealthy, with no direct housing mechanism. Any effect on housing affordability would depend entirely on how the government chose to spend the revenue raised — which is not specified.
The evidence
- The policy introduces an annual wealth tax, aligns CGT with income tax rates, reforms inheritance tax, and removes the Upper Earnings Limit on NI — but makes no specific commitment to housing spending. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Introduce an annual wealth tax of 1% on assets above £10 million and 2% on assets above £1bn. Align Capital Gains Tax rates with income tax and NIC rates on employment income, reform inheritance tax, and remove the Upper…”
- Aligning CGT rates with income tax could raise up to £16.7 billion annually, providing potential fiscal headroom that could in principle be directed to housing. — taxjustice.uk (media) — “Tax Justice UK estimates that aligning rates on income from wealth with income tax could raise £16.7 billion annually”
Biggest unknown: Whether any revenue raised would be directed toward social or affordable housing supply, rather than other spending priorities.
Our reading: This policy package is a tax reform aimed at raising revenue from high-wealth individuals. It has no direct mechanism affecting housing supply, rents, house prices, social housing stock, or tenure security — the core indicators for O1. Any positive effect on housing affordability would require the revenue raised to be hypothecated or directed toward housing investment, which the policy does not state. The CGT alignment in particular could theoretically affect the buy-to-let and second-home market (by making disposal less attractive), but the evidence provided does not address this channel. Given the absence of any housing-specific commitment in the policy text and no evidence linking these tax changes to housing outcomes, the effect on O1 is best characterised as negligible in direct terms, with a minor and highly uncertain indirect potential if revenues were spent on housing. Confidence is low because the causal chain from tax reform to housing affordability is entirely unspecified and evidence-free in the provided units.
Tax & the money you keep — Hurts
moderate · moderate confidence
This package of tax changes would reduce the money kept by higher earners, large capital gains recipients, and the very wealthy — the vast majority of ordinary households would be unaffected. For those who are hit, the increases are substantial, particularly the removal of the NI upper earnings limit and CGT alignment with income tax.
The evidence
- The policy would impose a 1% annual wealth tax on assets above £10 million and 2% on assets above £1 billion. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Introduce an annual wealth tax of 1% on assets above £10 million and 2% on assets above £1bn.”
- Capital Gains Tax rates would be aligned with income tax and NIC rates on employment income. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Align Capital Gains Tax rates with income tax and NIC rates on employment income”
- The Upper Earnings Limit on National Insurance would be removed, increasing NI on higher earners. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “remove the Upper Earnings Limit on National Insurance”
- Current CGT rates are substantially lower than income tax rates — e.g. 20% for higher-rate taxpayers on most assets versus a top income tax rate of at least 45%. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “current CGT rates (e.g., 10% for basic-rate taxpayers, 20% for higher-rate taxpayers on most assets, 28% for 'carried interest' and residential property gains for higher rate taxpayers, and 10% for Business Asset Disposa…”
- Capital gains are highly concentrated: in 2022/23, 41% of CGT receipts came from individuals with gains of £5 million or more, representing under 1% of CGT taxpayers. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “in 2022/23, 41% of Capital Gains Tax receipts came from individuals with gains of £5 million or more, who represent less than 1% of CGT taxpayers”
- Realised taxable capital gains of £55 billion in 2017-18 were concentrated among just 260,000 individuals (0.5% of UK adults). — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “In 2017-18, £55 billion in realised taxable capital gains were concentrated among 260,000 individuals (0.5% of UK adults)”
- Aligning CGT and reforming IHT could collectively raise almost £10 billion, representing a direct transfer from affected taxpayers. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “aligning CGT and IHT reforms could collectively raise almost £10 billion”
- The IFS supports CGT alignment for the broader population, arguing concerns about mobility of a small number of people should not deter reform. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “Supports the alignment of tax rates across different sources of income and capital gains, arguing that concerns about the mobility of a small number of people should not deter such reforms for the broader population”
Biggest unknown: How much behavioural response — especially from high-wealth individuals relocating overseas — would erode the actual tax burden imposed, and whether CGT alignment triggers large-scale asset disposals or lock-in effects.
Our reading: Every component of this policy package increases the tax burden on its target group, directly worsening their O11 position. CGT alignment with income and NIC rates would roughly double the rate on gains for higher-rate taxpayers (from ~20% to ~45%+), a large and direct reduction in money kept on asset disposals. Removing the NI Upper Earnings Limit raises the marginal rate on earnings above the current ceiling — a direct, immediate take-home pay reduction for higher earners. The annual wealth tax adds a recurring charge against accumulated assets for those above £10 million. IHT reform tightens reliefs and potentially expands the base. Crucially, the distributional incidence is narrow: capital gains are concentrated among 0.5% of adults; the wealth tax threshold of £10 million sits well above the wealthiest 1%'s average net wealth of ~£5 million (E3), meaning it applies to a tiny fraction even of the wealthy. The NI UEL removal is the broadest measure, hitting higher earners (roughly those above ~£50k). The overwhelming majority of households — those without large asset portfolios or above-UEL earnings — would see no change to their take-home pay from this package. For O11, the verdict is unambiguously 'worsens' for the affected groups. The magnitude is moderate rather than major because the measures are targeted at a small slice of the population; most households are untouched. The IFS and Wealth Tax Commission both raise serious doubts about whether the annual wealth tax raises the anticipated revenue (behavioural responses, valuation difficulty, avoidance), which creates real uncertainty about the effective burden imposed — but that uncertainty cuts against the magnitude of the burden landing, not against the direction. Where the burden does land, take-home pay and after-tax wealth are reduced.
Public finances & the next generation — Helps
moderate · moderate confidence
This package of tax reforms is designed to raise significant new revenue, which would improve fiscal sustainability — but the annual wealth tax component may raise much less than projected due to avoidance and administrative difficulties, meaning the overall fiscal gain is real but uncertain in size.
The evidence
- The policy introduces an annual wealth tax of 1% on assets above £10m and 2% above £1bn, aligns CGT with income tax and NIC rates, reforms inheritance tax, and removes the Upper Earnings Limit on NI. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Introduce an annual wealth tax of 1% on assets above £10 million and 2% on assets above £1bn. Align Capital Gains Tax rates with income tax and NIC rates on employment income, reform inheritance tax, and remove the Upper…”
- Oxfam estimates a 2% tax on wealth over £10m could raise £24bn annually — but this is an advocacy source and should be treated with caution. — oxfam.org.uk (media) — “Oxfam, for instance, claims a 2% tax on wealth over £10 million could raise £24 billion annually.”
- The IFS has strongly cautioned that an annual wealth tax is 'difficult to design and counter-productive'. — ft.com (media) — “The IFS has strongly cautioned against an annual wealth tax, arguing it is "not the answer to inequality" and would be "difficult to design and counter-productive."”
- An annual wealth tax could prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas, reducing actual revenue below headline estimates. — ft.com (media) — “it could "prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving or investment."”
- The Wealth Tax Commission (cited by the House of Commons Library) concluded that an annual wealth tax 'would not be effective because of high administrative costs relative to revenue, and because it would be easy to avoid paying the tax'. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “an *annual* wealth tax "would not be effective because of high administrative costs relative to revenue, and because it would be easy to avoid paying the tax."”
- The IFS and Wealth Tax Commission express significant reservations about the practicalities, administrative burden, and potential negative behavioural consequences of an annual wealth tax, suggesting it might not raise anticipated revenue. — ft.com (media) — “key economic think tanks like the IFS and the Wealth Tax Commission express significant reservations about the practicalities, administrative burden, and potential negative behavioural consequences of an *annual* wealth …”
- The Resolution Foundation estimates CGT and IHT reforms together could raise almost £10bn. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “The Resolution Foundation estimated that aligning CGT and IHT reforms could collectively raise almost £10 billion.”
- The IFS suggests CGT reforms could raise up to £4.5bn. — vertexaisearch.cloud.google.com (media) — “The IFS suggests reforms could raise up to £4.5 billion.”
- IHT currently raises around £7bn annually, with the OBR forecasting receipts rising to £14.7bn by 2030-31 under current policy. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “Forecasts IHT receipts of £8.7 billion in 2025-26, rising to £14.7 billion by 2030-31.”
Biggest unknown: Whether the annual wealth tax raises net revenue at all, given expert consensus that high administrative costs and behavioural responses (emigration, restructuring) could undermine its yield substantially.
Our reading: This policy package consists entirely of revenue-raising measures — new and reformed taxes on wealth, capital gains, inheritance, and high earners' NI contributions. From an O12 perspective, if these measures raise net revenue, they reduce reliance on borrowing and improve the fiscal path; if revenue falls short due to behavioural responses, the gain is smaller. The CGT and IHT reform components have the strongest independent support: the IFS endorses CGT alignment in principle and estimates up to £4.5bn; the Resolution Foundation projects ~£10bn from CGT and IHT reforms combined. These are not trivial sums relative to the fiscal position and represent funded (not borrowed) fiscal improvement. The annual wealth tax is much more uncertain. The IFS calls it 'difficult to design and counter-productive', and the Wealth Tax Commission (50+ experts) concluded an annual wealth tax would not be effective due to high administrative costs and ease of avoidance. Oxfam's £24bn estimate (advocacy source, flagged) significantly exceeds any independent institutional projection and cannot be given equal weight. The IFS's concern that wealthy individuals are internationally mobile at the very top of the distribution is specifically relevant to the wealth tax. The NI UEL removal is not quantified in the evidence but would raise additional revenue from high earners. On balance, the CGT and IHT components credibly improve fiscal sustainability at moderate scale within the parliament. The wealth tax may contribute little net revenue. The overall direction is 'improves' because even discounting the wealth tax heavily, the CGT/IHT/NI components represent real, evidenced revenue gains that reduce borrowing needs — but the magnitude is 'moderate' rather than 'major' given the real possibility the wealth tax disappoints materially.
Prosperity & living standards — Mixed picture
moderate · moderate confidence
Aligning capital gains tax with income tax rates has institutional support for improving economic efficiency, but the proposed annual wealth tax faces serious warnings from credible analysts about deterring investment and prompting capital flight. The net effect on prosperity and living standards is genuinely split across the policy's components.
The evidence
- The policy proposes a 1% annual wealth tax on assets above £10 million and 2% above £1 billion, CGT alignment with income tax and NIC rates, IHT reform, and removal of the NI Upper Earnings Limit. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Introduce an annual wealth tax of 1% on assets above £10 million and 2% on assets above £1bn. Align Capital Gains Tax rates with income tax and NIC rates on employment income, reform inheritance tax, and remove the Upper…”
- Capital gains are highly concentrated: in 2017-18, 62% of £55 billion in taxable gains went to just 9,000 people each realising over £1 million. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “In 2017-18, £55 billion in realised taxable capital gains were concentrated among 260,000 individuals (0.5% of UK adults), with 62% going to just 9,000 people who each realised over £1 million in gains.”
- Current CGT rates are substantially lower than income tax rates, creating a differential that influences behaviour and understates top-earner income shares. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “this differential has influenced behaviours and that the exclusion of capital gains from income statistics underestimates the top 1%'s share of income.”
- The IFS supports CGT alignment, arguing that concerns about mobility of a small number of people should not deter reform for the broader population, and that investment disincentive fears are often overstated. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “Supports the alignment of tax rates across different sources of income and capital gains, arguing that concerns about the mobility of a small number of people should not deter such reforms for the broader population.”
- The IFS warns the annual wealth tax could prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving or investment, harming productive investment. — ft.com (media) — “it could "prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving or investment."”
- The IFS characterises an annual wealth tax as 'difficult to design and counter-productive.' — ft.com (media) — “The IFS has strongly cautioned against an annual wealth tax, arguing it is "not the answer to inequality" and would be "difficult to design and counter-productive."”
- The Wealth Tax Commission concluded that an annual wealth tax would not be effective due to high administrative costs and ease of avoidance. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “an *annual* wealth tax "would not be effective because of high administrative costs relative to revenue, and because it would be easy to avoid paying the tax."”
- The IFS particularly highlights risks at the very top of the wealth distribution, where people are more internationally mobile and private businesses — hard to value — form a large share of wealth. — ft.com (media) — “The IFS highlights the severe drawbacks at the very top of the wealth distribution, where people are more internationally mobile and private businesses, which are hard to define and value, constitute a large share of wea…”
- CGT reform could raise up to £4.5 billion; combined CGT and IHT reforms could raise almost £10 billion. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “The Resolution Foundation estimated that aligning CGT and IHT reforms could collectively raise almost £10 billion.”
- CGT alignment could reduce incentives for investment, though the IFS argues low CGT rates are not well-targeted at attracting internationally mobile individuals. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “Could potentially reduce incentives for investment, though the IFS argues that low CGT rates are not well-targeted at attracting internationally mobile individuals and most CGT revenue does not come from highly mobile gr…”
Biggest unknown: Whether behavioural responses — capital flight, reduced business investment, asset restructuring — erode the anticipated revenue and harm productive investment enough to offset any efficiency gains from CGT alignment.
Our reading: This policy bundles measures with meaningfully different implications for O13. On the CGT component, the evidence leans cautiously positive for long-term economic efficiency: the IFS explicitly supports rate alignment and argues that investment disincentive concerns are overstated for the majority of taxpayers (E21, E24). The existing large differential between CGT and income tax rates distorts how people structure income and investment (E20), and removing that distortion could improve allocative efficiency over time. However, the annual wealth tax component is a different matter. Both the IFS and the Wealth Tax Commission — the latter a body of over 50 experts — explicitly warn that an annual wealth tax is administratively costly, easily avoided, and risks prompting capital flight and reduced saving or business investment (E4, E5, E6, E8). These are direct O13 harms: reduced business investment and departure of internationally mobile capital owners would weaken productivity and firm dynamism. The IHT reforms sit between these poles: there is broad expert support for closing reliefs that allow avoidance (E26, E43), with revenue potential of several billion (E30–E33), but behavioural restructuring and valuation difficulties add uncertainty. Removing the NI Upper Earnings Limit raises marginal rates on higher earners, with ambiguous effects on labour supply at that income level; the evidence provided does not allow a confident directional claim specific to O13. The counterfactual matters: absent this policy, the existing CGT distortions persist, but so does business investment at current levels. The CGT and IHT reform components likely produce small net gains for economic efficiency; the annual wealth tax likely produces a net drag on investment and business dynamism. The overall verdict is therefore mixed: two credible improvement channels (CGT alignment, IHT reform) offset by a well-evidenced investment risk from the annual wealth tax element. Confidence is moderate because key parameters — behavioural responses, actual revenue, and how proceeds are deployed — are unresolved.
Inequality & fair shares — Helps
moderate · moderate confidence
This package of taxes on wealth, capital gains, and inheritance is squarely aimed at the richest and would, on balance, narrow the gap between them and everyone else. The biggest caveat is that the annual wealth tax element may not work as planned, but the CGT and inheritance reforms have stronger expert backing for actually delivering.
The evidence
- The policy introduces a 1% annual wealth tax on assets above £10m, 2% above £1bn, aligns CGT with income tax and NIC rates, reforms inheritance tax, and removes the Upper Earnings Limit on NI. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Introduce an annual wealth tax of 1% on assets above £10 million and 2% on assets above £1bn. Align Capital Gains Tax rates with income tax and NIC rates on employment income, reform inheritance tax, and remove the Upper…”
- The wealthiest 1% of households held 10% of all household wealth in Great Britain in 2020-22. — ons.gov.uk (government) — “the wealthiest 1% of households held 10% of all household wealth in Great Britain between April 2020 and March 2022”
- Capital gains are highly concentrated: in 2017-18, 62% of £55bn in taxable gains went to just 9,000 people each realising over £1m. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “£55 billion in realised taxable capital gains were concentrated among 260,000 individuals (0.5% of UK adults), with 62% going to just 9,000 people who each realised over £1 million in gains.”
- Including capital gains, the top 1% income share rises from 13.8% to 16.8%, showing how CGT's lower rates understate top-end income concentration. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “Including capital gains, the top 1% income share rises from 13.8% to 16.8%.”
- 41% of CGT receipts in 2022/23 came from individuals with gains of £5m or more, less than 1% of CGT taxpayers. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “in 2022/23, 41% of Capital Gains Tax receipts came from individuals with gains of £5 million or more, who represent less than 1% of CGT taxpayers.”
- Current IHT effective tax rate is very low — around 3.5% of total inheritances and gifts estimated at £127bn pre-pandemic. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “the current system's effective tax rate is very low, around 3.5% of total inheritances and gifts (estimated at £127 billion pre-pandemic).”
- The wealthiest estates currently pay a lower effective IHT rate than less wealthy ones due to reliefs, making the current system regressive within IHT scope. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “Addressing generous reliefs would make the tax system fairer, as currently the wealthiest estates can pay a lower effective tax rate than less wealthy ones due to these reliefs.”
- The IFS supports aligning CGT rates with income tax, arguing concerns about taxpayer mobility should not deter reform for the broad population. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “Supports the alignment of tax rates across different sources of income and capital gains, arguing that concerns about the mobility of a small number of people should not deter such reforms for the broader population.”
- The IFS views taxing capital gains as a better approach to wealth inequality than an annual wealth tax. — ft.com (media) — “They view taxing capital gains as a better approach to wealth inequality than an annual wealth tax.”
- The IFS cautions that the annual wealth tax is 'not the answer to inequality' and would be 'difficult to design and counter-productive'. — ft.com (media) — “The IFS has strongly cautioned against an annual wealth tax, arguing it is "not the answer to inequality" and would be "difficult to design and counter-productive."”
- The Wealth Tax Commission concluded an annual wealth tax would not be effective due to high administrative costs and ease of avoidance. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “an *annual* wealth tax "would not be effective because of high administrative costs relative to revenue, and because it would be easy to avoid paying the tax."”
- An annual wealth tax could prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving. — ft.com (media) — “it could "prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving or investment."”
- CGT alignment and IHT reforms together could raise almost £10bn, targeting the very top of the distribution. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “aligning CGT and IHT reforms could collectively raise almost £10 billion.”
Biggest unknown: Whether the annual wealth tax raises meaningful revenue or prompts enough avoidance and emigration to blunt its redistributive effect — the IFS and Wealth Tax Commission both flag this risk.
Our reading: Every element of this policy is targeted at the top of the wealth and income distribution. The measurable baseline makes clear that wealth and capital gains are severely concentrated: the top 1% hold a disproportionate share of household wealth, 62% of capital gains flow to 9,000 individuals, and IHT reliefs currently allow the richest estates to pay lower effective rates than moderately wealthy ones. All four policy instruments — the wealth tax, CGT alignment, IHT reform, and removing the NI Upper Earnings Limit — shift tax burden onto people at the very top, with gains (retained income/wealth) distributed across the broader population. That is the textbook mechanism for narrowing O14's gap. However, the verdict is not unqualified. The annual wealth tax component is seriously questioned by the IFS and Wealth Tax Commission on implementation grounds: avoidance, emigration of internationally mobile wealthy individuals, and valuation complexity could blunt its redistributive effect substantially. These are credible, sourced concerns from independent institutions. That said, the IFS explicitly backs CGT rate alignment — which is where the evidence on redistributive impact is strongest — and notes concerns about mobility are overstated for most CGT taxpayers. IHT reform also has strong support for closing reliefs that benefit the wealthiest estates most. On balance, the CGT and IHT elements are well-evidenced to narrow the inequality gap, and even a partially effective wealth tax adds redistributive pressure at the very top. The direction is 'improves' O14; magnitude is moderate rather than major because the wealth tax's real-world yield is genuinely uncertain and behavioural responses could erode revenue. Confidence is moderate: the CGT/IHT elements are robustly supported, but the overall package includes a contested instrument whose inequality-narrowing effect could be significantly weaker than stated.
Good work & fair pay — Mixed picture
minor · low confidence
This package of tax changes mainly hits the very wealthy and high earners, so most workers would feel little direct effect on their pay. The main risk is that higher taxes on capital gains and wealth could reduce investment and therefore job quality, though credible economists dispute how large that effect would be.
The evidence
- The policy would remove the Upper Earnings Limit on National Insurance, meaning employees earning above that threshold would pay NI on all earnings, reducing their net pay. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “remove the Upper Earnings Limit on National Insurance”
- Capital Gains Tax rates would be aligned with income tax and NIC rates on employment income. — greenparty.org.uk (manifesto) — “Align Capital Gains Tax rates with income tax and NIC rates on employment income”
- Current CGT rates for higher-rate taxpayers on most assets (20%) are substantially lower than income tax rates (top rate at least 45% since 2010 plus NI), creating a differential that influences behaviour. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “current CGT rates (e.g., 10% for basic-rate taxpayers, 20% for higher-rate taxpayers on most assets, 28% for 'carried interest' and residential property gains for higher rate taxpayers, and 10% for Business Asset Disposa…”
- Realised taxable capital gains are heavily concentrated: 62% went to just 9,000 people who each realised over £1 million in gains in 2017-18. — resolutionfoundation.org (institutional) — “62% going to just 9,000 people who each realised over £1 million in gains”
- A wealth tax could prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving or investment, potentially reducing capital available for job-creating activity. — ft.com (media) — “prompt wealthy individuals to move overseas and favour spending over saving or investment”
- The IFS argues that concerns about the investment impact of CGT reform are overstated for the majority of CGT taxpayers, and that low CGT rates are not well-targeted at attracting internationally mobile individuals. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “low CGT rates are not well-targeted at attracting internationally mobile individuals and most CGT revenue does not come from highly mobile groups”
- The IFS supports aligning tax rates across income and capital gains for the broader population, arguing concerns about mobility of a small number of people should not deter such reforms. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “Supports the alignment of tax rates across different sources of income and capital gains, arguing that concerns about the mobility of a small number of people should not deter such reforms for the broader population”
Biggest unknown: Whether aligning CGT with income tax rates and introducing a wealth tax meaningfully reduces business investment and job creation, or whether — as the IFS suggests — those fears are largely overstated for the majority of affected taxpayers.
Our reading: For most ordinary workers — those earning below the Upper Earnings Limit (roughly £50,000) and without large capital gains or inherited wealth — this policy package has little direct effect on take-home pay or job security. The UEL removal reduces net pay only for higher earners. CGT alignment and the wealth tax target investors and the very wealthy, whose tax treatment has limited direct bearing on typical employment conditions. The indirect O4 risk is that higher taxes on capital gains and wealth could depress investment, reducing job creation or quality over time. The IFS and Wealth Tax Commission both flag this, with the latter specifically warning an annual wealth tax is easy to avoid and administratively costly. However, the IFS simultaneously argues that CGT reform fears are overstated for the bulk of taxpayers and that most CGT revenue comes from relatively immobile groups — so the investment chilling effect may be modest and concentrated. On the other side, a more neutral tax treatment of earned versus unearned income (CGT aligned with income tax) could marginally improve fairness for workers who currently face higher effective rates on labour income than wealthy individuals face on capital returns. This is a modest distributional improvement, not a direct pay or employment boost. Overall, the policy's effects on O4 are real but limited in magnitude for ordinary workers: a small improvement in fairness between earned and unearned income, offset by genuine but contested risks to investment and job creation at the top end. The evidence points both ways on the investment question with no clear resolution, justifying a 'mixed' verdict at minor magnitude.