Prevent New Waste Incinerators
Conservative · what the evidence says
An independent, source-checked look at Conservative’s policy “Prevent New Waste Incinerators” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.
Public finances & the next generation — Little effect
minor · low confidence
Banning new waste incinerators is primarily a planning and environmental regulation — it does not directly commit or save public money in a way that materially shifts the national debt path. Any indirect fiscal effects on waste-management costs are speculative and not evidenced by OBR or IFS analysis.
The evidence
- The policy prevents new waste incinerators, including those with recent permits where substantial construction has not yet started. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “prevent new waste incinerators from being built, including those with recent permit approvals where substantial construction has not taken place”
- Landfill tax has risen to £126.15 per tonne, increasing disposal costs for waste that cannot go to incinerators. — recyclinginside.com (media) — “From £103.70 per tonne to £126.15 per tonne”
- A £40/tonne carbon cost on EfW could add £400,000 annually per 10,000-tonne facility, illustrating that incineration itself carries rising fiscal externalities. — recyclinginside.com (media) — “A £40/tonne carbon tax could add £400,000 annually for a facility managing 10,000 tonnes”
- UKWIN argues existing and consented capacity already exceeds projected residual waste volumes, suggesting new incinerators would create overcapacity at public expense. — ukwin.org.uk (media) — “if all currently consented incineration capacity were built, it could exceed 28 million tonnes, while the genuinely residual waste feedstock is projected to fall to around 13.4 million tonnes by 2042”
Biggest unknown: Whether higher landfill and alternative waste-processing costs borne by local authorities or the Exchequer would exceed savings from avoided incineration subsidy or carbon liabilities — no independent fiscal estimate is provided in the evidence.
Our reading: O12 is concerned with the national debt path, debt-interest burden, and whether spending is funded or borrowed. This policy is a regulatory prohibition on private-sector construction — it neither appropriates public funds nor creates a statutory spending commitment. The principal fiscal interactions are indirect: local authorities face rising landfill tax costs if waste cannot be incinerated, and incinerators themselves face growing carbon liabilities under an ETS regime. These partly offset each other in fiscal terms. The overcapacity argument (E14) suggests avoiding new builds could prevent local authorities from being locked into 'put-or-pay' contracts that would constitute contingent public liabilities, but this is an advocacy-sourced projection (UKWIN) with no independent fiscal quantification. No OBR, IFS, or Treasury costing of this policy is present in the evidence. Because the policy imposes no direct Exchequer cost or saving of material size relative to total public finances, and no credible macro-fiscal analysis is available to judge indirect effects, the verdict is negligible — leaning very slightly positive in the long term (avoided overcapacity lock-in, avoided carbon externalities) but not supported strongly enough by independent evidence to score higher than negligible.
Clean environment & nature — Helps
minor · moderate confidence
Stopping new incinerators would prevent additional CO2 emissions and air pollution, and remove incentives that discourage recycling — but existing plants continue operating, so the near-term environmental gain is limited. How much recycling actually improves depends on separate policies and whether councils are freed from existing long-term contracts.
The evidence
- The policy prevents new incinerators from being built, including those with recent permits where substantial construction has not begun. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “prevent new waste incinerators from being built, including those with recent permit approvals where substantial construction has not taken place”
- In 2022/23, 49% of all municipal waste collected by local authorities in England was incinerated, while only 40% was recycled. — gov.uk (media) — “In 2022/23, almost half (49%) of all municipal waste collected by local authorities in England was incinerated, while only 40% was recycled”
- Incinerated waste in the UK nearly trebled between 2010 and 2020, rising from 6.5 million to 19.0 million tonnes. — researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk (government) — “Total waste incinerated in the UK nearly trebled between 2010 and 2020, rising from 6.5 million tonnes to 19.0 million tonnes”
- The amount of household waste incinerated in England has exceeded the amount recycled since 2019. — opendemocracy.net (media) — “the amount of household waste incinerated in England has exceeded the amount recycled since 2019”
- Scotland and Wales have already banned new incinerator plants. — theguardian.com (media) — “Scotland and Wales have already banned new incinerator plants due to environmental concerns”
- If all currently consented incineration capacity were built, it could exceed 28 million tonnes, while genuinely residual waste feedstock is projected to fall to around 13.4 million tonnes by 2042 — implying significant overcapacity. (Source: UKWIN, an advocacy body; treat as indicative.) — ukwin.org.uk (media) — “if all currently consented incineration capacity were built, it could exceed 28 million tonnes, while the genuinely residual waste feedstock is projected to fall to around 13.4 million tonnes by 2042”
- The Climate Change Committee has recommended CCS be installed at all EfW plants by 2045, suggesting a potential future role for incineration if decarbonised — a pathway this policy may foreclose for new builds. — circularonline.co.uk (media) — “The Climate Change Committee (CCC) has recommended that Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) technologies be installed at all EfW plants by 2045 to capture 90-95% of emissions”
- Preventing new incinerators would reduce local air quality concerns associated with new plant construction. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “Preventing new incinerators would alleviate concerns from local communities and environmental groups about air quality, increased traffic, and localized pollution”
Biggest unknown: Whether halting new-build capacity meaningfully shifts waste away from burning toward recycling, or whether waste defaults to landfill instead, depends on recycling infrastructure investment and the resolution of existing 'put-or-pay' contracts with current plants.
Our reading: The policy's direct environmental effect is to prevent new incineration capacity being added to an already large and growing base. Since incineration has overtaken recycling as the dominant disposal route since 2019, and the UK's incineration capacity nearly trebled in a decade, capping new build prevents further lock-in of a high-carbon, waste-intensive infrastructure pathway. Near-term gains are modest: existing plants continue, so CO2 emissions and air quality impacts from the current fleet are unchanged. The environmental improvement is primarily long-term — preventing overcapacity that UKWIN (an advocacy source, treated as indicative) projects could far exceed genuinely residual waste volumes, and removing the structural incentive that 'put-or-pay' contracts create against recycling. The government's own capacity note supports the view that existing/permitted capacity is sufficient, meaning the ban does not risk pushing waste to landfill. The CCC's recommendation for CCS at EfW plants by 2045 introduces some tension: if incineration is eventually decarbonised, preventing new-build now forecloses some flexibility — but this pathway is speculative and does not outweigh the near-certainty of additional unabated emissions from new plants built in the interim. On balance, the policy modestly improves the long-term environment by capping emissions trajectory growth and removing recycling disincentives, though the magnitude is minor because the existing fleet is unaffected and recycling uplift depends heavily on complementary policies outside this measure's scope.