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Stop supermarket price fixing and support direct sales for farmers

Reform UK · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Reform UK’s policy “Stop supermarket price fixing and support direct sales for farmers” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Prosperity & living standards — Mixed picture

minor · low confidence

This policy could help farm businesses retain more income and diversify, improving rural economic viability, but the evidence that CMA powers would materially fix systemic price problems at economy-wide scale is weak, and direct sales face real scalability limits. The net effect on aggregate prosperity and living standards is modest at best.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether granting additional CMA powers would actually uncover and stop genuine price-fixing at scale, given that the CMA's own reviews have not found systemic weak retail competition to be the primary inflation driver.

Our reading: The policy has two distinct mechanisms for O13. First, expanded CMA powers to tackle price fixing. The baseline evidence shows farmers are squeezed — as little as 15% of retail price — and three-quarters feel financial pressure from supermarket practices. However, the CMA already holds investigation and enforcement powers, and its own 2023–24 reviews found no systemic weak retail competition driving aggregate inflation. The incremental value of 'granting powers' on top of this is uncertain; there is no evidence unit showing a comparable intervention delivering material productivity or living-standard gains at scale. The projected upside (doubling or tripling farmer income share) comes from advocacy-adjacent sources and is contingent on actual price-fixing being found and stopped — which the CMA's own evidence casts doubt on as the dominant problem. Second, direct sales and farm shop support. Farm diversification already accounts for 72% of farm businesses, and direct sales demonstrably improve farm margins. Zero business rates and planning relief would reduce fixed costs and ease barriers for farm shops, modestly improving rural business viability and local economic activity. But scalability is explicitly limited — direct sales cannot replace supermarket chains at volume — so the aggregate living-standards effect is confined to rural and small-farm segments, not economy-wide productivity or opportunity. On balance, the direct-sales/farm-shop strand has a small positive projected effect on farm business viability and rural economic opportunity, making it a mild 'improves' for that segment. The CMA price-fixing strand rests on contested premises (the CMA's own evidence does not confirm systemic fixing is the root cause of aggregate food price problems), and there is a plausible countervailing risk that price controls force costs onto farms rather than retailers. The net effect across both strands is mixed, but minor in aggregate scale. Confidence is low given genuine expert disagreement and the absence of comparable real-world evidence that the CMA mechanism fires at scale.

Cost of living — Mixed picture

minor · low confidence

This policy aims to cut unfair supermarket pricing and help farmers sell direct, which could modestly lower some food prices — but the evidence suggests supermarket price-fixing is not the main driver of food inflation, and the direct-sales route benefits mainly those who can access farm shops. Ordinary shoppers are unlikely to see a big difference at the till.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the CMA would actually find and stop genuine price-fixing at supermarket level — the regulator's own assessments have not found systemic weak competition between retailers to be the primary cause of high food prices.

Our reading: The policy has two main planks: CMA action on supermarket pricing, and enabling direct farm sales. On the CMA plank, the regulator's own evidence found no systemic weak competition between retailers driving aggregate food inflation — the problem identified was with supplier profitability in some branded categories, not retailer price-fixing per se. Existing competition law is also ill-suited to rapid intervention against price gouging. So the prospect of meaningful, swift consumer price reductions from this lever is low. There is a residual risk that forcing retailers to cut margins simply pushes pressure down the supply chain onto farmers, as industry leaders warn. On the direct-sales plank, zero business rates for farm shops and easier planning should modestly reduce fixed costs for farms diversifying into retail — a real, if small, benefit. Farms that can sell direct may offer fresh produce at lower-than-retail prices. But the scalability constraint is significant: direct sales cannot substitute for supermarket supply chains at volume, and access is geographically uneven, favouring rural consumers over urban lower-income households who most need cost-of-living relief. Overall, the policy may deliver marginal cost-of-living improvements for some consumers — particularly those near farm shops — and marginally better farm economics that could moderate producer-price volatility upstream. But the central premise that supermarket price-fixing is meaningfully suppressing or inflating consumer food prices lacks evidential support from the CMA's own findings. The net effect on ordinary household food bills is likely minor and long-term at best, with real uncertainty about direction for the poorest urban households.

Good work & fair pay — Helps

minor · low confidence

This policy could improve income and security for farmers by tackling unfair supermarket practices and enabling direct sales, but the CMA's own evidence hasn't found systemic price-fixing, and direct sales can only reach a limited number of farms at scale.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether the CMA will find actionable price-fixing evidence sufficient to intervene, and how many farms can realistically shift to viable direct-sales models.

Our reading: The policy targets two mechanisms: strengthening CMA enforcement against supermarket pricing practices, and facilitating direct farmer-to-consumer sales via planning and rates reform. On the CMA side, there is measurable evidence that farmers face real financial pressure from supermarket buying practices, but the CMA's own investigations have not found systemic price-fixing as the primary driver of food inflation, and competition law is not built for rapid intervention. This significantly narrows the realistic near-term benefit to farm incomes from CMA powers alone. The projected doubling or tripling of farmer income from fairer pricing is speculative and sourced from a non-institutional advocacy-adjacent body. On the direct sales side, farmers who can shift to direct channels do demonstrably retain a much larger share of value. Zero business rates for farm shops would reduce a meaningful fixed cost. However, direct sales face real barriers — infrastructure, marketing, scale — and cannot replace supermarket channels for most farming operations. The policy does not commit specific budgets, enforcement timelines, or quantified targets. Absent the policy, farmers remain exposed to power imbalances in the supply chain with limited recourse. The marginal gain is real but modest and slow: the CMA route is constrained by existing evidence gaps on price-fixing, and the direct sales route helps those farmers able to diversify but cannot move the needle at population scale. One warning flag: caps on supermarket prices could, perversely, squeeze farm-gate prices further if retailers pass the burden down the chain. Overall: a minor long-term improvement for a subset of farmers, with low confidence given weak enforcement baseline and scalability limits.