Increase police presence and efficiency on the beat

Crime, justice & national security — Helps

minor · moderate confidence

Putting more officers on the beat, cutting paperwork, and using better technology are all evidence-backed levers for improving public safety and confidence — but the size of the effect depends heavily on how deployment is targeted, and key details like funding and numbers are unspecified.

The evidence

• The policy commits to returning police to the beat, using better technology, reducing paperwork, and allowing PCSOs to become police officers before phasing out the role. — reformparty.uk (manifesto) — “Reform UK will ensure police return to the beat, utilise better technology, reduce paperwork, and allow PCSOs to become police officers before phasing out the role.”
• The proportion of people seeing officers on foot patrol weekly or more has fallen sharply, from 39% in 2011 to 11% in 2025, and public satisfaction with local police has dropped from 62% to 49% over the same period. — ons.gov.uk (government) — “the proportion of people seeing officers on foot patrol weekly or more has significantly decreased from 39% in March 2011 to 11% in March 2025”
• Increased visible police presence is associated with greater public confidence and reassurance, which is a component of perceived safety. — college.police.uk (media) — “Increased visible police presence is strongly associated with greater public confidence, reassurance, and perceptions of police effectiveness and fairness.”
• Random or reactive foot patrols have no demonstrated crime-reduction effect; the deployment strategy — particularly hotspot targeting — is what matters. — college.police.uk (media) — “Random or reactive patrols, where officers pass through an area regardless of the crime rate, have shown no crime reduction effect.”
• AI tools in policing are projected to free up 6 million hours of police work per year, equivalent to 3,000 officers, by automating routine tasks and reducing bureaucracy. — news.npcc.police.uk (media) — “aiming to free up 6 million hours of police work per year (equivalent to 3,000 officers) by automating routine tasks and reducing bureaucracy, allowing officers to focus on frontline duties”
• Technology is identified as a key driver for improving crime prevention, detection, and operational efficiency. — lordslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “Technology is seen as a key driver for improving performance in crime prevention, detection, and increasing efficiency.”
• PCSOs currently focus on visible patrolling, tackling anti-social behaviour, and community engagement, but have limited powers including no power of arrest. — en.wikipedia.org (media) — “Police Community Support Officers (PCSOs) are uniformed staff with limited powers (e.g., no power of arrest) focused on visible patrolling, tackling anti-social behaviour, and community engagement.”
• Targeted PCSO patrolling at hotspots has produced measurable crime-prevention effects — an increase of 21 minutes daily per hotspot prevented crimes leading to an estimated 2,914 days of imprisonment. — cam.ac.uk (academic) — “An increase of 21 minutes of daily PCSO patrolling per hot spot (equivalent to two full-time PCSOs costing around £50,000 annually) prevented crimes leading to an estimated 2,914 days of imprisonment”

Biggest unknown: Whether deployment is targeted at crime hotspots (evidence-supported) or simply increases random patrol (shown to have no crime-reduction effect), and whether the policy is funded at sufficient scale to move population-level crime indicators.

Our reading: The policy bundles three distinct levers — more visible patrol, efficiency gains via technology and paperwork reduction, and a PCSO-to-officer pipeline — each of which has some evidential support for improving safety outcomes under O5, but each conditioned on implementation detail. On visible patrol: the measurable baseline shows a dramatic decline in perceived police presence (39% to 11% seeing foot patrols weekly) and falling public satisfaction. Reversing this trend would plausibly improve public confidence and perceptions of safety, which are genuine O5 indicators. However, the evidence is clear that random patrol has no crime-reduction effect; hotspot-targeted deployment is what generates actual crime reduction. The policy does not specify targeting strategy, so the O5 benefit is contingent. On technology and paperwork: the AI and technology evidence suggests substantial efficiency gains are already in train (6 million hours/year projected nationally), meaning the policy's stated direction aligns with an ongoing trajectory rather than representing a uniquely additional instrument. Reducing paperwork has a plausible mechanism — officers avoiding arrests due to administrative burden is noted in the evidence — so gains here are credible but hard to quantify without a committed budget or statutory instrument. On the PCSO phase-out: the Cambridge hotspot evidence shows targeted PCSO patrol has real, measurable crime-prevention value at low cost. Phasing out PCSOs removes this capacity unless replaced by a comparable number of warranted officers deployed similarly — a transition risk the policy does not address. On counterfactual: the government has already deployed 3,123 additional neighbourhood officers and PCSOs ahead of target, and is investing £140m+ in technology. Some of the gains this policy promises are therefore already being delivered, limiting the marginal additionality. Overall, the direction is a genuine 'improves' on O5's safety and confidence indicators, but the magnitude is minor because the effect depends on hotspot targeting (unspecified), the PCSO transition carries risk, and much of the technology agenda is already in motion. Confidence is moderate given solid evidence on the mechanisms but absence of committed instruments or funding in the policy text.