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New Nationwide Active Travel Strategy

Liberal Democrat · what the evidence says

An independent, source-checked look at Liberal Democrat’s policy “New Nationwide Active Travel Strategy” — what it would actually do across the things that affect your life. Every claim below quotes the source behind it. How this works.

Prosperity & living standards — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

Building cycling and walking networks and fixing roads could boost living standards through household savings, productivity gains from less congestion, and a strong economic return on investment — but past active travel programmes have repeatedly fallen short of targets, so the real-world gain depends heavily on sustained delivery.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether funding commitments will translate into at-scale infrastructure given the Committee of Public Accounts finding that the DfT was already 'not on track' on active travel targets.

Our reading: This policy touches O13 through three channels: household cost savings, productivity/congestion effects, and infrastructure quality. On household living standards, the evidence is concrete: substituting active travel for a second car yields ~£1,700/year in savings, and pothole repair directly reduces the £320–£500/year vehicle damage cost borne by drivers. Both are real, near-term gains for households, though they accrue only to those who change behaviour or currently drive on affected roads. On productivity and business dynamism, the evidence is directionally consistent but less precise. Active travel reduces congestion (which positively impacts productivity), supports local retail spending, and reduces sick days — all of which feed into the living-standards indicators. The benefit-to-cost ratios (3.5:1 to 35.5:1) are high by infrastructure standards, suggesting that if the spending materialises, returns exceed costs. On road maintenance, the existing backlog is severe (17% of the network in poor condition, £16.81bn catch-up cost). Redirecting more roads budget to councils addresses a real productivity drag and reduces household vehicle repair costs, with no credible counter-argument in the evidence. The main drag on confidence is delivery. The Committee of Public Accounts found the DfT already not on track on active travel targets, and the IPPR notes progress has stalled despite aspirations. Active travel's share of transport spending remains very low. This means the policy's headline ambitions may outpace the actual infrastructure delivered, limiting how much of the BCR potential is realised. On balance, the evidence supports a moderate improvement in O13 over the long term: the mechanisms are sound, the BCR evidence is strong, and road maintenance has immediate household benefit — but delivery risk is real and material, preventing a 'major' verdict.

Cost of living — Helps

minor · low confidence

Repairing potholes and roads could modestly reduce vehicle repair bills for drivers, and better cycling infrastructure could help some households avoid running a second car — but the headline active travel strategy is aspirational with no committed budget, so the bigger household savings depend heavily on whether the infrastructure is actually built and used.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether sufficient ring-fenced funding will be committed to deliver active travel networks at a scale that shifts household travel behaviour, given evidence that active travel has historically been chronically underfunded.

Our reading: The policy has two distinct mechanisms for O2. First, redirecting the roads budget to repair potholes and pavements delivers a direct, concrete saving: with the average driver losing £320–£500/year to vehicle damage and 17% of the road network in poor condition, better-maintained roads would reduce repair bills at population scale within this parliament. This earns a real, if modest, improvement in cost of living. Second, the active travel network element — which offers the larger potential gain (£1,700/year household savings from avoiding a second car) — is framed as a strategy to be created, with no committed budget, statutory duty, or quantified target stated in the policy text. The track record is discouraging: active travel receives just 2% of the transport budget outside London, the DfT was already not on track to meet its own prior targets, and progress has stalled. Without a committed funding instrument, the mechanism exists in theory but has not historically fired at scale. Absent this policy, road maintenance backlogs would continue to accumulate costs for drivers; the roads-budget reallocation is therefore genuinely additional to baseline. But the active travel savings are contingent on infrastructure delivery and substantial behavioural change — both uncertain. On balance, the verdict is a minor improvement, driven primarily by the road-maintenance commitment, with low confidence because the scale of budget reallocation is unspecified and the transformative active travel element remains aspirational.

Healthcare — Helps

minor · low confidence

Better cycling and walking infrastructure could reduce NHS demand by improving population health and cutting GP visits, but the benefit depends on whether the strategy actually shifts travel behaviour at scale — and past government active travel targets have not been met.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether this strategy delivers sufficient infrastructure uptake to shift travel behaviour at population scale, given the Committee of Public Accounts found the DfT 'not on track' on previous active travel objectives.

Our reading: The O3 outcome for healthcare asks whether people can get treated when they need it, encompassing NHS waiting lists, GP access, and capacity against demand. This policy's pathway to healthcare improvement is indirect but evidence-supported: if it successfully shifts travel behaviour at population scale, it would reduce chronic disease incidence and thereby reduce NHS demand — notably through fewer GP appointments and avoided mortality from cardiovascular disease, diabetes, and cancer. The ATE projection of 1.7 million freed GP appointments is material in the context of current access pressures. The Health Foundation mortality estimates further support a genuine population-health dividend. However, three factors cap confidence and magnitude. First, the mechanism is demand-side (prevention) rather than capacity-side (more staff, beds, or appointments): the health gains accumulate over years as cohort health improves, so the time horizon is long-term and effect on near-term waiting lists is negligible. Second, the policy text itself is partly aspirational — 'a new nationwide active travel strategy' and redirecting roads budget are instruments, but no committed funding quantum for cycling/walking infrastructure specifically is stated in the policy text (the £4.5bn figure in E21 is from a DfT strategy, not this policy). Third, delivery risk is severe: the Committee of Public Accounts found prior targets missed, the IPPR describes chronic underfunding, and safety perceptions remain a deterrent for large groups. Absent this policy, NHS demand from preventable chronic disease would continue to grow. Counterfactually, the marginal gain from this policy above the baseline depends entirely on whether new infrastructure is built at scale and whether uptake follows — both uncertain. The verdict is 'improves/minor/long-term' with low confidence: the causal chain is credible and the evidence base is institutional, but the delivery gap and behavioural uncertainty mean the projected NHS benefit cannot be treated as a reliable near-term gain.

Clean environment & nature — Helps

minor · low confidence

Shifting short trips from cars to walking and cycling would reduce vehicle emissions and carbon output, but the actual environmental gain depends heavily on how many people genuinely change their travel behaviour — and past active travel strategies have struggled to deliver that shift at scale.

The evidence

Biggest unknown: Whether this strategy can meaningfully shift travel behaviour at population scale, given that previous government active travel targets have been missed and funding has historically been well below recommended levels.

Our reading: The environmental case for active travel infrastructure is directionally clear: replacing car trips with walking and cycling reduces vehicle miles, tailpipe emissions and carbon output. The Scotland evidence shows this mechanism does fire in the real world, though at modest scale (230 tonnes saved annually from one programme). The projected figure of 700 million fewer vehicle miles and a potential 6% global emissions cut are plausible upper-bound estimates, but both are conditional on behaviour change at scale actually materialising. The delivery record undercuts confidence significantly. The Committee of Public Accounts found the DfT was not on track on its own targets by 2025, and average walking activity fell across 2017–2021. IPPR (an advocacy source, flagged as such) describes active travel as chronically underfunded at 2% of the transport budget. The policy text offers no committed budget figure, no statutory instrument, and no quantified target — it promises a 'strategy' and a reallocation within the existing roads budget. That is a soft instrument. The near-term environmental effect is therefore likely minor: better pavements and cycleways can modestly increase active travel but the modal shift needed to move emissions indicators at population scale requires sustained investment and behaviour change that past strategies have failed to deliver. The long-term effect could be more meaningful if the strategy is properly funded and maintained, particularly as new routes take time to generate genuinely new trips rather than displacing existing ones. On balance, the direction is a genuine if modest improvement, concentrated in the long term, with low confidence given delivery history and the absence of hard financial commitments in the policy text itself.