Support Ukraine and Tackle Russian Corruption

Crime, justice & national security — Helps

moderate · moderate confidence

This policy strengthens UK national security by supporting Ukraine against Russian aggression, advancing NATO integration, and tackling Russian-linked money laundering and corruption flowing through the UK. The main caveat is that several key elements — NATO membership and asset seizure — depend on allies' agreement and face significant legal and diplomatic hurdles.

The evidence

• Labour commits to ongoing military, financial, diplomatic and political support for Ukraine. — labour.org.uk (manifesto) — “Labour's military, financial, diplomatic, and political support for Ukraine will remain steadfast.”
• Labour will back a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Russia. — labour.org.uk (manifesto) — “They will back calls for a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression”
• Labour will support seizing and repurposing frozen Russian state assets for Ukraine. — labour.org.uk (manifesto) — “support efforts to seize and repurpose frozen Russian state assets for Ukraine”
• Labour will work to give Ukraine a clear path to NATO membership. — labour.org.uk (manifesto) — “play a leading role in providing Ukraine a clear path to NATO membership”
• Labour will tackle corruption and money laundering including in Britain, Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories. — labour.org.uk (manifesto) — “work with allies to tackle corruption and money laundering, including in Britain, Crown Dependencies, and British Overseas Territories”
• The UK has frozen £28.7 billion in Russian-linked assets as of May 2025. — researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk (government) — “As of May 2025, the UK had frozen £28.7 billion in Russian-linked assets.”
• Globally, approximately $285 billion in Russian Central Bank reserves are immobilised in EU and G7 institutions. — researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk (government) — “Globally, approximately $285 billion (€260 billion) in Russian Central Bank foreign currency reserves are immobilized in EU and G7 institutions.”
• Money laundering costs the UK over £100 billion annually, with total economic crime costing £350 billion a year. — committees.parliament.uk (government) — “The National Crime Agency estimates money laundering costs the UK over £100 billion annually, with total economic crime costing £350 billion a year.”
• Russian or Russian-linked illicit finance constitutes a significant volume channeled through the UK economy. — committees.parliament.uk (government) — “Russian or Russian-linked illicit finance constitutes a "significant volume" channeled through the UK economy.”
• Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories frequently feature in money laundering investigations. — committees.parliament.uk (government) — “Addressing illicit finance in Crown Dependencies and British Overseas Territories, which frequently feature in money laundering investigations, is crucial.”
• A Special Tribunal could hold Russian leaders accountable and restrict travel of sanctioned officials, exerting further international pressure on Russia. — theguardian.com (media) — “This initiative would exert further international pressure on Russia and potentially restrict the travel of sanctioned Russian officials.”
• Legal experts highlight challenges of establishing a Special Tribunal, particularly regarding state immunity and achieving international consensus. — lawfaremedia.org (media) — “Legal experts and politicians often discuss the challenges of establishing such a tribunal under international law, particularly concerning state immunity and achieving broad international consensus on its legal basis an…”
• Ukraine's NATO path is contingent on the political will of other major NATO powers, especially the US, and there is no realistic prospect of a breakthrough in the short term. — atlanticcouncil.org (media) — “There is "no realistic prospect of any breakthrough toward Ukrainian membership of the alliance" in the short term.”
• Legal experts and officials significantly disagree on the legality of seizing sovereign state assets under international law. — lawfaremedia.org (media) — “There is significant disagreement among legal experts and officials regarding the legality of seizing *state* assets (especially central bank reserves), as opposed to merely freezing them.”
• If frozen asset seizure succeeds, it could provide significant funding for Ukraine's reconstruction while shifting financial burden to the aggressor state. — crisisgroup.org (media) — “If successful, this policy could provide a significant funding source for Ukraine's reconstruction, shifting the financial burden from international taxpayers to the aggressor state.”

Biggest unknown: Whether the UK can secure allied consensus on Ukraine's NATO path and the legal seizure of Russian state assets, both of which are contingent on other major powers' political will and international legal frameworks.

Our reading: This policy addresses O5 across three distinct channels: collective security (Ukraine/NATO), justice (Special Tribunal), and domestic security (anti-corruption/money laundering). On national security, continued military and financial support for Ukraine directly sustains resistance to an active aggressor state that poses a security threat to Europe and the UK. The commitment to a clear NATO membership path for Ukraine, if achievable, would permanently strengthen the collective defence architecture. However, cited evidence is clear that no short-term breakthrough is realistic and the UK cannot unilaterally advance this — the effect on O5 from this element is contingent and distant. On justice, the Special Tribunal aspiration is directionally positive for the international rule of law and for deterrence of future aggression. Cross-party UK support exists, and Norway/Council of Europe precedents offer a viable pathway. But cited expert disagreement on state immunity and enforcement means this remains a projected rather than assured gain. On asset seizure, the £28.7bn UK freeze and $285bn global freeze represent substantial leverage. If repurposed, these could sustain Ukrainian defence, reducing the security burden on UK and NATO members. But major legal challenges — sovereign immunity, precedent risk — mean the delivery is genuinely uncertain. On corruption and money laundering, the evidence is strongest. The £100bn+ annual money laundering cost to the UK, the significant volume of Russian-linked illicit finance, and Crown Dependency exposure are measurable baselines. Committed action here — if delivered — would materially reduce a real crime burden. Transparency International flags that ambition must translate into concrete reform of offshore transparency, but the direction of effect is clear. Overall, the policy's combination of sustained deterrence, justice mechanisms, and serious domestic anti-corruption commitments points clearly toward improved national security and reduced crime — but the magnitude is moderated by the heavy dependence on multilateral agreement and legal resolution of contested questions.