Protect First Past the Post Electoral System

Equal treatment & democratic rights — Hurts

minor · moderate confidence

By locking in First Past the Post and an 18-year voting age, this policy preserves documented inequalities in how votes translate into representation and keeps 1.7 million 16- and 17-year-olds excluded from national elections. The main caveat is that FPTP also provides local accountability, and public opinion on votes at 16 is divided.

The evidence

• The policy commits to keeping FPTP and not lowering the voting age from 18. — conservatives.com (manifesto) — “remains committed to the First Past the Post system for elections, maintaining the direct link with the local voter, and will not change the voting age from 18”
• In the 2024 election, vote-to-seat ratios were starkly unequal across parties: Reform UK won 14.3% of votes but 0.7% of seats; the Liberal Democrats won 12.2% of votes but 11.1% of seats. — electoral-reform.org.uk (media) — “Reform UK gained 14.3% of the popular vote but only 5 seats (0.7% of Parliament), while the Liberal Democrats, with 12.2% of the vote, won 72 seats (11.1% of seats)”
• Since 1935, approximately 90% of single-party majority governments have governed without the support of a majority of voters. — electoral-reform.org.uk (media) — “Since 1935, approximately 90% of single-party "majority" governments have not had the support of a majority of voters”
• The IFS has noted that FPTP contributes to political inequality, with significant disparities in how different demographic and socio-economic groups feel their voices are heard. — ifs.org.uk (institutional) — “The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) notes that FPTP contributes to political inequality, leading to significant disparities in how different demographic and socio-economic groups feel their voices are heard”
• Supporters of smaller parties with nationally spread support can experience disenfranchisement under FPTP. — aceproject.org (media) — “This can lead to feelings of disenfranchisement among their supporters”
• Maintaining the voting age at 18 means approximately 1.7 million 16- and 17-year-olds in England and Northern Ireland remain ineligible to vote in reserved elections. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “approximately 1.7 million 16- and 17-year-olds in England and Northern Ireland remain ineligible to vote in reserved elections”
• Scotland and Wales have already lowered the voting age to 16 for their devolved and local elections, creating a divergence with national elections. — commonslibrary.parliament.uk (government) — “Scotland and Wales have lowered the voting age to 16 for their devolved and local elections”
• Academic evidence from Scotland suggests lowering the voting age to 16 can boost political engagement, but long-term effects on non-electoral engagement or socio-economic inequalities were not consistently maintained. — ed.ac.uk (academic) — “the long-term effects on non-electoral forms of political engagement or addressing socio-economic inequalities in engagement were not consistently maintained as voters aged”
• FPTP is argued by supporters to ensure a direct link between an MP and their local constituency, enhancing local accountability. — electoral-reform.org.uk (media) — “ensures a direct link between an MP and their local constituency, making representatives more accountable to their local electorate”
• Some experts caution that lowering the voting age without improved political education could worsen problems of low electoral turnout among young people. — committees.parliament.uk (government) — “lowering the voting age without improvements in political education could worsen problems of low electoral turnout among young people”

Biggest unknown: Whether alternative electoral systems would genuinely deliver more equal democratic outcomes in practice, or whether their own distortions would offset the gains in vote-weight equality.

Our reading: This policy preserves two status quo arrangements that bear directly on O9's core indicators — equal democratic voice and voting rights. On FPTP: the evidence, including from the IFS (an institutional source), shows the system produces substantial political inequality. Votes for parties with diffuse national support are structurally near-worthless in seat terms, as the 2024 election data on Reform UK and Liberal Democrat seat shares illustrates. Since 1935, the vast majority of single-party majority governments have lacked majority voter support. These are measurable features of the current system, not contested projections. The local-accountability argument is a real partial offset, but it does not address vote-weight inequality across the electorate. On the voting age: 1.7 million 16- and 17-year-olds are excluded from national elections despite already having the franchise in Scotland and Wales for devolved elections. The Scottish evidence on engagement is positive, though not uniform at longer horizons, and some experts caution about readiness without better political education. The policy does not actively worsen the current position — it maintains it — but by explicitly committing to block reform, it forecloses improvements to democratic equality that the evidence suggests would follow from either change. The magnitude is minor rather than moderate because the baseline does not deteriorate: the harm is one of foregone improvement, not new damage. Confidence is moderate because the evidence on FPTP's democratic costs is institutionally grounded, but the counterfactual retains genuine uncertainty, and local accountability is a legitimate cited offset.